The Facts:
More than 90,000 are believed to have been killed during conflict with a further 200,000 thought to have died from conflict related causes (estimates of the total death toll thus far ranges between 300,000 – 450,000);
A further 2.7 million people are said to be displaced living in camps for refugees or internally displaced people (IDPs), squatting in shacks, living with relatives or sheltering in the bush. Few others have fled further afield claiming asylum;
90% of Darfur’s villages have been destroyed;
3.6 million people are dependent on international humanitarian aid.
The Cause:
Low-level conflict has simmered in Darfur for years, characterised primarily by disputes between nomadic and sedentary groups, because of increased competition for resources – grazing grounds for cattle and livestock.
Nomads were accustomed to move south during the dry season after the harvest to graze their herds on the fields of sedentary farmers; this provided food for the animals of the nomads and manured the fields of the farmers. This system, which was always delicately balanced, began to break down as a result of increased population, desertification and changes in lifestyle.
Farming groups began to herd their own animals and wanted to stop nomads from grazing on their lands. At the same time, nomads tended to leave part of their group farming during the rainy season and increasingly wanted land to farm on.
Clashes between farming groups and nomads were regular, as was the use of traditional reconciliation mechanisms. If someone was killed, for example, it was customary for the group or family which had caused the killing to pay diya (blood money) to the group or family of the person killed.
Timeline:
February 2003: Angry at what they perceived to be a lack in government protection against village attacks and the marginalisation of Darfur the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) take up arms. The government of Sudan responded by exploting the existing tensions in the region, supporting the militias from largely Arabic-speaking nomadic groups;
July 2003: Janjaweed militia with support from the government begin offensive attacks murdering, raping and driving people out of their homes;
March 2004: Mukesh Kapila (the United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan) called Darfur the “world’s greatest humanitarian crisis”;
April 2004: An African Union-brokered ceasefire is signed in N’Djamena (Chad’s capital) but later repeatedly violated by all sides;
July 2004: UN Security Council gives Khartoum 20 days to disarm the Janjaweed, bring its leaders to justice and allow humanitarian assistance… but with no enforcement the conflict continues;
September 2004: George W Bush declares the Darfur crisis ‘genocide’;
October 2004: The AU expands its mandate to protect civilians and sends in a peacekeeping force of 7,000 troops;
January 2005: Government attacks on civilians decrease, partly due to the majority of targeted villages already being destroyed and their inhabitants displaced;
31 January 2005: The UN releases a 176-page report saying that while there were mass murders and rapes of Darfurian civilians, they could not label the atrocities as “genocide” because “genocidal intent appears to be missing”;
March 2005: The UN Security Council refers the war crimes committed in Darfur to the International Criminal Court for investigation;
December 2005: Chad declares itself ‘in a state of war’ with Sudan following violent clashes along the Darfur-Chad border;
May 2006: The Darfur Peace Agreement, brokered by the AU is signed by the Government of Sudan and a faction of the SLA rebel group. All the other rebel leaders including the JEM reject the deal, claiming it doesn’t address key issues such as power sharing and disarmament of the Janjaweed. Fighting continues on all sides;
August 2006: UN Security Council passes resolution 1706, calling for a 23,000-strong UN-led peacekeeping force in Darfur by January 2007. But the resolution ‘invites the consent’ of the government, and Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir states ‘there will not be any international military intervention in Darfur as long as I’m in power’;
September 2006: The first ‘Global Day for Darfur’ is held by campaigners around the world;
November 2006: The government agrees in principle to allow a ‘hybrid’ force into Darfur with enhanced UN support for AU forces. The government subsequently adds many restrictions to delay the hybrid force becoming operational;
December 2006: The conflict is increasingly spilling over into Chad, as Chadian rebels supported by the government of Sudan clash with Darfurian rebels supported by the government of Chad. Tens of thousands of Chadians are displaced. Militia attacks on refugee camps in Chad increase, displacing some Darfurians for the third time;
February 2007: The International Criminal Court (ICC) indicts two people – Sudanese Minister for Humanitartian Affairs, Ahmad Muhammad Harun, and Janjaweed commander Ali Kushayb – for crimes against humanity in Darfur. This is the first time someone who is currently in government has been indicted by the ICC. Khartoum declares that it will not co-operate and instead will try Kushayb in its own ’special criminal court’ – a clear attempt to pre-empt independent prosecution. Some Jajaweed leaders, concerned they may also be tried by the government, start switching allegiance to the rebels;
April 2007: Under pressure from China, Khartoum removes its opposition to 3,000 UN peacekeepers entering Darfur as part of the ‘hybrid’ force;
September 2007: 12 African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) peacekeepers, whose mandate is to protect civilians, were killed in Haskanita, apparently by forces from armed opposition groups;
May 2008: Unprecedented assault by the JEM on Khartoum;
14 July 2008: The ICC serves a warrant (issued March 4 2009) for the arrest of Omar al-Bashir outlining five counts of crimes against humanity and two of war crimes in Darfur (a further three for genocide were dropped due to insufficient evidence of a specific intent to destroy ethnic groups in Darfur);
November 2008: President Bashir announces a ceasefire;
November 2008: The ICC calls for arrest of three rebel commanders;
February 2009: A ceasefire is agreed by the JEM with a committment to end conflict with the Sudan Government in three months;
March 2009: The ICC’s arrest warrant for Bashir is filed but is unlikely to make any difference as the ICC does not have a police force and the warrant will be delivered to Sudan’s government, who are not likely to execute it.
Sources: Amnesty International, New Internationalist, BBC etc.
This is not the end.